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Antoaneta L. Dimitrova and Bernard Steunenberg
Institute of Public Administration, Leiden University, The Hague, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
In this article we focus on compliance with European Union (EU) directives in the
context of multilevel governance. Policies specified by EU directives move
through different decision-making stages before they are implemented. We
integrate these decision-making stages and actors in a game-theoretical
model aiming to explain implementation in the EU setting. Practice and
organizational literature findings already indicate that in this setting formal
and informal policies can differ considerably. Our model shows that such a
divergence is the result of the interactions of three sets of actors at different
levels. We illustrate the main findings of our model with cases of transposition
and implementation of the EU rules regarding cultural heritage in the
European Union. Based on our analysis, we suggest that EU policy
implementation is best understood as a patchwork of domestic processes in
which implementing actors affect outcomes within limits set by national and
European decision-makers.
KEYWORDS Bureaucracy; compliance; cultural heritage policy; European policy implementation;
multilevel games
1. Introduction
How do European policies work when national politicians are divided? Ever
since Lipsky’s (1980) ground-breaking book, scholars of public policy have
acknowledged that implementation of policies depends on the views and
capacity of street-level bureaucrats as much as policy-makers. Looking at
the European Union (EU) context, Lipsky’s arguments suggest an additional
challenge for implementation. To be effective for the EU as a whole, many
(if not all) EU policies require alignment between politics (in transposition)
and bureaucracy (in implementation) at different levels of governance. In
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this article we present a three-level model of implementation and a set of
empirical cases in the area of cultural heritage policy that show alignment
between implemented policies of member states is quite difficult to
achieve. As the European Commission found in its implementation reports,
national administrations were unaware ‘ … of the existence – and the need
for protection and defence – of goods which are part of the cultural heritage
of other member states’ (European Commission 2000: 7).
The literature on compliance with EU law comprises more than three gener-
ations of studies using different models and approaches to transposition and
policy implementation in the EU (Mastenbroek 2005; Toshkov et al 2010;
Treib 2014).1 Given the need for extensive data gathering at the micro level
to study the actual implementation of policies, transposition studies still dom-
inate this literature, yet the potential gap between transposition and implemen-
tation is widely acknowledged (Falkner and Treib 2008; Zhelyazkova et al. 2016).
Theoretically, different lines of inquiry have roughly followed the division
between management and enforcement approaches (Tallberg 2002; Masten-
broek 2005). While there has been a steady stream of work showing the impor-
tance of administrative capacity, the capacity approach cannot easily explain
differences between sectors in the same member state or even between
issues in the same policy area (Haverland et al. 2011). Therefore, we expect
actor-driven explanations, including political and administrative actors involved
in transposition and implementation at different levels, to provide better
insights into existing variation in implementation.
Aiming to explain situations when compliance varies between sectors in
the same country or even in the same policy sector, we explore a three-
level model of political–administrative interactions. Previous work on cultural
heritage policy in Bulgaria (Dimitrova and Steunenberg 2013) proposed a
model explaining the existence of different outcomes from the adoption of
one and the same formal European policy as a result of the interplay of
actors at the EU, national political and national administrative levels. This
article departs from this model and develops it further as a three-level inter-
action, including Commission oversight. We explore outcomes under a wide
range of domestic preferences and different regimes of European supervision.
Empirically, we present research from the implementation of the EU policy on
moveable cultural heritage policy. We examine the state of the policy in four
EU member states. The selection of the cases of France, Lithuania, The Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom (UK) aims to represent different types of policy:
conservationists (France, Lithuania) versus market oriented countries (The
Netherlands, the UK). The countries selected also vary in size and centraliza-
tion and represent old and new(er) member states.
The case descriptions are based on various sources of data including gov-
ernment documents, evaluations and parliamentary debates. In addition, the
analysis draws on a student capstone project involving studying cultural
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heritage policy in depth and also using secondary sources supplemented with
interviews with senior administrators or experts.2
The EU has recently revised the key piece of legislation in the area of
movable cultural goods, Directive 93/7/EEC, recast by Directive 2014/60/EU.
One of the main reasons to do so has been poor implementation: in its
fourth report on the implementation of the legislation, the European Commis-
sion characterized ‘the illegal trafficking of cultural objects’ as ‘a scourge
affecting the European Union’ (European Commission 2013: 9). The Commis-
sion pointed out the need to ensure the return of illegally removed national
treasures by improving administrative co-operation and consultation between
the authorities ‘which carry out the tasks provided for in the directive’ (Euro-
pean Commission 2013: 9). The clear importance of the administrative layer of
governance for achieving the EU-wide objectives of the policy makes EU
moveable cultural heritage a suitable case for illustrating our three-level
model of interaction.
2. A framework for understanding domestic policy
implementation
The study of transposition of EU directives in the national legislations of the
member states has become part of a very extensive literature (Mastenbroek
2005; Toshkov et al. 2010; Treib 2014). A long-standing weakness of this litera-
ture has been the predominance of transposition studies taking the adoption
of (directives) into national legislation as a measure for compliance. Neverthe-
less, implementation studies have also grown in the last decade, often
focused on a country or group of countries or alternatively on a policy area
in several countries. Many of the existing case studies find poor implemen-
tation is rooted in low administrative capacity (Toshkov et al. 2010). Yet
general levels of administrative capacity and government effectiveness do
not account for existing variation in both transposition and implementation
between sectors in the same country (Haverland et al. 2011; Zhelyazkova
et al. 2016).
Some recent studies build on previous actor-driven models (Steunenberg
2007), but also incorporate capacity as a factor for implementation. Investi-
gating the transposition and implementation of the cross-border health
care directive, Vasev and Vrangbæk (2014) combine actor- and capacity-
driven approaches by focusing on the role of bureaucrats and the available
policy resources. They stress the independent role played by domestic admin-
istrative actors, as shown earlier in Dimitrova and Steunenberg (2013), but also
find that bureaucrats take into account resource availability in choosing trans-
position and implementation strategies. In addition, a broad comparative
study by Zhelyazkova et al. (2016) investigating implementation in four
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policy areas has shown that policy area characteristics matter more than
country characteristics for implementation.
While recognizing the importance of structural factors, both administrative
(Börzel et al. 2010) and cultural or political (Falkner et al. 2005), we seek to
explain implementation variation occurring within the same country and
even within the same sector. To do this, we develop a theoretical model of
the interaction between actors at three different levels – the European,
national and administrative levels – in one policy sector.
Lipsky’s (1980) insights that street-level bureaucrats may have discretion to
change policies are difficult to integrate systematically in implementation
studies. A different theoretical stream, the principal–agent literature, views
bureaucratic discretion as a result from expertise or structural features of
the decision-making process. While the classical literature sees discretion as
stemming from information asymmetry in favour of the agent, later studies
highlight the structural difficulties of multiple principals to agree on a
course of actions concerning agent performance (see, for instance, Eskridge
and Ferejohn 1992).
Inspired by this work, we model the interactions between domestic politi-
cal and administrative actors involved in transposing and implementing Euro-
pean policy as a game. We define the implementation of an EU policy as a
sequence of stages starting with the adoption of a domestic formal policy
(legal transposition) by national political (parliaments) or administrative
actors (ministries). After transposition, actual implementation takes place.
Administrative actors with a responsibility for implementation shape the
newly adopted formal policy so that it fits to practices on the ground.3
These administrative actors are mid-level state officials and civil servants
who, similarly to veto players, are in an organizational position which
makes them key figures for policy implementation.
Views and understandings emerge in the public domain as discourses,
which we conceptualize here as coherent sets of statements or expressions
of worldviews defining game forms as well as preferences of actors. Prefer-
ences are expressions of desirability; in our case, the kinds of policies actors
prefer. To describe preferences, we rely on the tools of positive political analy-
sis (see Shepsle 2010) and assume that each player – a policy-maker or an
implementing authority in our framework – has a most preferred position
on policy, which is called an ideal point. Moreover, a player’s preference for
an alternative policy depends on the distance from their ideal point. The
farther away an alternative policy is from a player’s ideal point, the less pre-
ferred this policy. Finally, we model the policy area as a one-dimensional
outcome space, representing its key feature of sectoral/issue orientation.
Our proposed framework takes into account European supervision of the
domestic implementation process, reflecting the multilevelness of the Euro-
pean policy process. We include the European Commission as an enforcer;
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that is, an external agency with a certain capacity to impose the European
policy on domestic actors.4 When enforcing a European policy, the external
agency faces transaction costs. These costs are a function of possible ambigu-
ities in the interpretation of European law, information asymmetries, or
capacity limitations. As a consequence, we expect that the enforcer will not
challenge every deviation from a European policy, but only those deviations
that go beyond the limits set by these costs. These values define a set of sus-
tainable proposals, policies that will not be challenged by the enforcer. We
label this set the enforcer’s costs-induced indifference set. Furthermore, we
assume that the enforcer aims to ‘protect’ the European legislative status
quo and therefore has an ideal position that equals the policy embedded in
European law.5
Domestic policy-makers decide on policy in anticipation of the enforcer’s
response. We make a distinction between the legal or formal policy and the
actually implemented or informal policy (Dimitrova and Steunenberg 2013:
250), which is relevant with regard to the role of the enforcer. The European
Commission is quite well informed about the legal transposition of a directive
from the obligatory notifications of domestic legislative measures. This is not
necessarily the case with the actual implementation of policy. In this article,
we assume variation in the extent to which the enforcer is able to observe
policy and monitor implementation. There are two possibilities, which we
label as ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ supervision. In the case of ‘strong’ supervision,
we assume that enforcer is aware of both the formal and informal policy.
However, there are many reasons, first and foremost its own capacity limit-
ations, to expect that the Commission is not aware of informal policy prac-
tices. To expect the Commission would be able to monitor all policies in all
twenty-eight member states at the level of actual implementation is unrealis-
tic. It is, however, quite plausible that the Commission is aware of problem
member states or policy areas where non-compliance is brought to its atten-
tion by non-state actors. In other words, there are possibilities for both strong
and weak supervision depending on the policy field and member state in
question. Under ‘weak’ supervision we assume that the Commission only
notes the formal policy, which is set during transposition, but remains
unaware of the informal, implementing policy.
We model the decision-making process as a game with two main stages,
which include decision-making on the domestic policy and subsequently
the evaluation of this policy by domestic and European actors. The first
stage includes the well-known steps of transposition, leading to the setting
of a formal policy, and subsequently implementation.
In the first stage, domestic policy-makers and the implementing actor(s)
decide on the domestic policy. The domestic policy-makers set a legal or
formal policy, which transposes a European directive into the national legal
order. In making this decision, each player needs to approve the policy, as
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 1215
represented by the veto power of each participant. Furthermore, one of these
players acts as an agenda-setter making proposals to the others. The agenda-
setter can be a ministry that has the lead in the transposition process, or
another actor that has special responsibility for the domestic transposition
of a directive. Subsequently, the implementing player (‘implementer’)
decides how the formal policy will be implemented. Since the implementing
player may have rather different views on policy, he/she may change the
policy during implementation. This difference between the legal or formal
policy and the implemented or informal policy is also known as ‘bureaucratic
drift’ (McCubbins et al. 1987).
In the second stage, the Commission and the domestic policy-makers
review domestic policies (evaluation stage). Based on this review, these
actors can decide to reverse the policy either to the formal policy (domestic
policy-makers) or the European policy (Commission). The domestic policy-
makers can change the informal policy by issuing more specific domestic
legislation, replacing the leadership of the implementing organization, or
changing the institutional arrangement under which the implementing
organization makes its decisions (for instance, by incorporating an oversight
body). The Commission can use ‘naming and shaming’ strategies (Börzel
2003) or, ultimately, an infringement procedure to change the formal as
well as the informal policy (Steunenberg 2010). The Commission can also
initiate new, amended legislation. Importantly, these possibilities constrain
the domestic actors in making their policy choice. In this way the domestic
decision-making process on policy is ‘nested’ in a broader, European compli-
ance game.
3. Political–administrative conditions affecting compliance
According to this model, implementation can take different routes depending
on the European policy (e.g., status quo), enforcement costs faced by the
Commission (as reflected by its costs-induced indifference set to the status
quo), and the preference of implementing player vis-à-vis the European
policy and the domestic player with agenda-setting power, respectively. To
summarize the preferences of the domestic policy-makers we use the
concept of unanimity set: these are all points domestic players cannot
change by unanimity (e.g., not casting a veto). The points that are elements
of this set are located between the extreme members of these groups; that
is, the left-most and right-most domestic veto players along a single
dimension.
The policy states resulting from various combinations of European status
quo points, enforcement costs and preferences are summarized in Table 1,
while the equilibriums supporting the policy outcomes are described in the
Online Appendix. In this table we denote the European policy as q (e.g.,
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Table 1. Outcomes of the implementation games.
Location of the European policy: In domestic unanimity set Not in domestic unanimity set
Location of the European
enforcer’s indifference set:
Overlaps or is (partially) included in






























‘Strong’ oversight pF = pI = q pF = q and pF ≠ pI pF = pI pF = pI pF ≠ q and pF ≠ pI pF = pI
‘Weak’ oversight pF = pI = q pF = q and pF ≠ pI pF = pI pF ≠ pI pF ≠ q and pF ≠ pI pF ≠ pI
Note: See the Online Appendix for further details on the various policy states and the conditions under which they occur (including Table A-1); the grey cells for the game with ‘weak’
European oversight (last row) indicates outcomes that differ from those found for the model with ‘strong’ oversight. These differences aremore choice options for the implementing


















status quo), the formal policy as pF, and the informal policy as pI. Finally, in the
model and in the table we distinguish between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ oversight
by the Commission.
Based on the model’s analysis of the interplay of the three levels of actors,
we can identify four different main types of domestic responses to a European
policy. These responses vary between full alignment with the European policy
to decoupling, implementing a different domestic informal policy while sym-
bolically adhering to the European formal policy. More specifically, the main
types are:
1. Incidental domestic compliance (see also Dimitrova and Steunenberg 2013:
251): This policy state is an undisputed and straightforward implemen-
tation of the European policy, which according to our model only occurs
under rather strict and specific conditions. Only when the implementer
likes the European policy and this policy falls in the domestic unanimity
set, it will be precisely implemented.
2. Formal domestic compliance: This policy state is similar to the previous
one, but the implementing player prefers a different informal policy
than the European one. While the domestic players cannot move the
formal policy away from the European one and are forced to transpose
literally the European directive (Steunenberg 2007: 30), the implementing
player chooses a deviating informal policy better fitting to his/her prefer-
ences. This informal policy is located in the domestic unanimity set to
avoid domestic challenge during the evaluation stage. In case of ‘strong’
oversight, the policy is also located in the (partially) overlapping indiffer-
ence set of the Commission. In this policy state, the deviation between
the formal and informal policy is the result of inertia of the domestic
veto players.
3. Domestic adaptation, and incidental and constrained domestic adaptation:
When the European policy is not in the domestic unanimity set, the dom-
estic players have an incentive to shift the European policy closer to their
preferences. If the Commission’s costs-induced indifference set overlaps
with the domestic unanimity set, such possibilities exist. In that case, dom-
estic adaption is the cause of differences between the domestic and Euro-
pean policy. How far the policy is shifted depends on the enforcer’s
indifference set, since the domestic policy-makers do not want to be chal-
lenged by the Commission. Furthermore, the formal policy is shaped by
the preferences of the domestic player with agenda-setting power, who
will set a policy as close as possible to their own ideal position. Differences
in preferences between the agenda-setter and the implementer – and the
fact that the domestic players cannot reverse the implementer’s choice if
the policy is in the unanimity set – cause differences between the formal
and informal policy.
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Domestic adaptation includes two special cases. These occur: (a) when
the agenda-setter and the implementer share the same, rather centric pre-
ferences (e.g., preferences in the overlapping part of the unanimity and
indifference sets), leading to the same formal and informal policies (inci-
dental domestic adaptation); and, (b) when the agenda-setter and the
implementer have both more conservative, non-centric preferences (e.g.,
preferences that do not fall into the overlapping sets), they select the
same policies, at least under ‘strong’ Commission supervision (constrained
domestic adaptation). These specific cases are basically a ‘lucky’ incidence
of coincident preferences and a corner solution with regard to Commission
oversight.
4. Imposed formal compliance: In this last policy state, the European policy
(and the Commission’s interpretation of it) differs substantially from the
preferences of the domestic players. The Commission’s indifference set
does not overlap the domestic unanimity set. Consequently, and in
order to avoid being challenged, the domestic players have to adapt
their formal policy towards the European one. Their best choice is a
formal policy equal to the lower limit of the Commission’s indifference
set (e.g. pF = tl). The implementing player is forced to implement the
same policy under ‘strong’ supervision, otherwise it risks being challenged.
Under ‘weak’ supervision, however, the implementing player has more dis-
cretion, as the Commission does not monitor its policy. In that case, the
implementer can choose any policy from the domestic unanimity set, as
domestic players will not be able to reverse this choice, creating a substan-
tial difference between the informal and formal policy.
This analysis has several major implications. To start with, it shows that an
implementing policy that reflects the formal policy as well as the European
one (e.g. pF = pI = q) is just one possible outcome among several others.
This outcome of having the same European, formal and implementing
policy is found only when preferences are aligned (see Table 1).
Another important insight following from the analysis is that the discretion
of administrative actors – our implementers – varies according to the level of
EU supervision and the size of the domestic unanimity set. Domestically, the
unanimity set is important, since it defines the extent to which domestic pol-
icymakers can affect the implementing policy carried out by the adminis-
tration. The more the views of politicians diverge, the wider this set is,
allowing the administration more discretion in setting the actual (informal)
policy. Conversely, the more similar the preferences of politicians, the
smaller the unanimity set, leading to a more restrictive informal policy
choice. In the latter case, the administration cannot diverge much from the
national political leadership. Finding that administrative actors have more dis-
cretion when political players are strongly divided corresponds with the
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conclusions of analyses of deadlocked political systems (see Crozier 1964; Kes-
selman 1970).
To explore and illustrate these findings, we research the implementation of
moveable cultural heritage policy in the EU. Having been recently recast by
the EU, the main policy measures and their implementation have been
subject of considerable attention by the Commission, member states and
European Parliament, and present ample opportunities to explore the differ-
ences between formal policy and implementation and the divergence
between political and administrative actors.
4. European cultural heritage policy
European Union policies on cultural heritage were initially defined in relation
to the freedoms at the core of the EU’s Internal Market, until a revision in
2013–2014 which shifted the emphasis to national cultural heritage and its
economic importance. Article 36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union (TFEU) provides the possibility of member states to restrict the
free movement of goods in order to protect national treasures of artistic, his-
torical or archaeological value. After the abolition of border controls in 1993,
the policy needed to be fleshed out to ensure the protection of national cul-
tural treasures.
The policy was shaped by secondary legislation, in the form of Directive
93/7/EEC and Regulation 3911/92 (later repealed by Regulation 116/2009)
and their Annexes specifying arrangements for the return of national treas-
ures unlawfully removed from a member state. The policy adopted in 1992–
1993 was restrictive, detailed and specific, as member states feared being
overwhelmed by complains by individuals seeking the return of cultural
artefacts (European Parliament 2014: 22). The key elements of the policy
rested on the specification of the type of cultural objects that could be
classified as national treasures (in terms of age and monetary value) and
administrative co-operation to ensure the return of unlawfully exported
national treasures.
The transposition of Directive 93/7/EEC bymember states was late and only
completed by 1999. According to the Commission, a number of member
states transposed incorrectly or incompletely. For example, a number of
national laws transposing Directive 93/7/EEC failed to mention the obligation
to provide information and the general principle of co-operation between the
member states (European Commission 2000: 13). As stipulated in Directive 93/
7/EEC, the Commission and the member states created a system for evaluat-
ing the application of the regulation and the directive under which four
reports have been published, covering implementation problems respectively
for the periods 1994–1999, 1999–2003, 2004–2007 and 2008–2011. The
implementation reports draw on member states’ responses to detailed
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questionnaires and their own assessments. They highlight considerable differ-
ences in implementation between the member states.
From our perspective, the most important finding from the Commission
reports and from the European Parliament report (2014) is that member
states and their administrations had very diverse preferences, growing
further apart with the 1996 and 2004/2007 enlargements (European Com-
mission 2000, 2005, 2009; European Parliament 2014). In contrast to the
UK and France, which had, by the time of negotiation, well-developed, if
different, policies of evaluating cultural artefacts and establishing market
value, a number of member states that acceded in 1996 and 2004 did
not have such legislation at all (European Commission 2000, 2009). Formal
domestic policies on EU cultural heritage policy range from policies to facili-
tate trade with cultural goods to policies primarily targeting the preservation
of national heritage.
Taking these differences into account, based on the Commission reports
we distinguish between different groups of member states, which we label
the ‘traders’ and the ‘conservationists’. The traders have substantial art
markets and handle cultural artefacts from the whole of the EU and further
afield. Member states from this group, like UK and the Netherlands, had
pre-existing legislation and policy aiming to facilitate art trade (European
Commission 2000: 11–12). The conservationists are primarily concerned with
the preservation of their own cultural heritage. Countries belonging to this
group had more restrictive legislation, aiming to control exports. Countries
in this group include France and Lithuania, examined below, but also Italy,
Greece and, after 2007, Bulgaria (Dimitrova and Steunenberg 2013).
In its policy evaluation, the Commission did not choose between the differ-
ent groups of countries and their positions, but it ultimately went along with
some of the conservationists in revising Directive 93/7/EEC. Cultural heritage
does not appear to be an area in which the Commission proactively seeks to
make an impact, given that the policy is not given priority in the political pro-
gramme of the Commission (Juncker 2014). Despite the reported differences
in implementation, there are no infringement cases seeking change in dom-
estic policy (except for non-transposition). Therefore, we label the Commis-
sion’s oversight as ‘weak’ based on the definition in our model.
The following paragraphs examine policy preferences and implementing
actors in each of our four cases.
4.1. The United Kingdom
The UK is an important centre for the international art market and British
policy aims to strike a balance between the protection of national heritage,
the rights of owners selling goods and of purchasers, and the reputation of
the UK (Netten 2014: 37–8).
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The UK transposed Directive 93/7/EEC very early with the return of cultural
objects regulations from 1994. Similarities between the Directive and the UK
legislation suggest the country was able to upload its approach to the EU level
to a certain extent. The UK law is almost identical to the directive and has had
only two amendments, in 1997 and 2001, following EU-level amendments.
However, the UK had a formal policy in this area long before the EU legislation.
The ‘Export Control Act 2000′ from 2002 covered all exports from the UK and
not only exports to the EU. Therefore, the law is supplemented by an Order of
the Secretary of State on the ‘export of objects of cultural interest’ in 2003. The
‘European license’ issued under the Council regulation 3911/92 is only one of
four different export licenses mentioned in the Order.
The institutions carrying out implementation are the Export Licensing Unit
at the Arts Council and the Reviewing Committee on the Export of Works of
Art and Objects of Cultural Interests (RCEWA). When deciding whether a cul-
tural object is a national treasure, the Art Council consults experts that refer to
the criteria developed by the Waverly committee in 1952. The Waverly criteria
define historical, aesthetic and scientific reasons why a cultural object might
be a national treasure. While the initial export license applications are handled
by experts hired by the Arts Council, the Reviewing Committee mediates in
case of disagreement and balances the interests between owners, national
heritage considerations and the market (Netten 2014).
The UK provides clear information to all involved of the relevant criteria for
defining a cultural good as a national treasure. The UK also maintains a regis-
ter of objects with a ‘temporary export deferral’. The key implementing actor,
the Reviewing Committee produces clear and exhaustive annuals reports
explaining policy practice. It has examined a total of 207 cases between
2003 and 2013. The UK issues by far the largest number of export licenses
in the EU under Regulation 3911/92, a total of 38,445 licenses for the
period 1993–1998, far more than the second largest issuer, France, with
8,338 licenses (European Commission 2000: 19).
The examination of administrative procedures and transparency in infor-
mation provision suggests UK informal policy does not deviate from the
formal or European policy, except that the UK aims to cover export authoriz-
ations for the whole world and not only the EU. National legislation neatly fits
to the requirements of the European legislation, accommodating the needs of
the international art trade. We can classify the policy state in the UK as inciden-
tal domestic compliance.
4.2. The Netherlands
Before the adoption of the European framework, cultural heritage protection
in the Netherlands was based on a law adopted in 1984. Based on this law, a
short list of items, considered ‘essential’ and ‘irreplaceable’ for Dutch cultural
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heritage, was composed. This list is short, partly because cultural objects
owned by government (e.g., museums) are not included, but it also illustrates
the liberal stance of the Netherlands with regard to cultural goods.
During the preparation of the European policy, the Netherlands, like the
UK, was able to ‘upload’ part of their approach (Houwing 2015). Directive
93/7 was transposed in a rather direct manner without additional conditions
on the return of cultural objects. The Dutch did not add any further licensing
of cultural goods next to the European rules. Only when cultural goods fall
within the categories defined by European law is a permit needed.
Analysing the positions of the main political parties, especially those in
government, shows that they supported the existing rules. There was not
much of a debate on the introduction of the new legislation. The media pub-
lished only one critical article in which the Dutch Association for Art Trade
expressed concerns that the new rules might hinder the art trade (Houwing
2015: 47).
Implementation was delegated to the Cultural Heritage Inspectorate,
which is an agency directly under the responsibility of the minister of edu-
cation, culture and science. Similar to other countries, Customs play an impor-
tant role as the front office in checking and detecting illegal export and import
of objects. Owing to the centralization of the licensing process, in which also
the minister may object to the export of an important work of art, the variation
in preferences is rather limited. Based on this preference configuration, we
classify this case as incidental domestic compliance (Houwing 2015: 49).
4.3. France
In France there was already a cultural heritage policy in place before the dis-
cussion and adoption of the European policy in 1992. This policy was based on
a law adopted in 1941 regulating the protection of works of art in France. This
law resembles the EU policy, especially with regard to the grounds to refuse
export. Not surprisingly, the French managed to swiftly transpose Directive
93/7 and embedded the implementation of the European legislative frame-
work in the already existing structure under the Ministry of Culture and
Communication.
While most of the requirements were transposed along the lines of the
directive, the French adopted a slightly broader definition of cultural goods.
In addition, they introduced by decree a detailed categorization of various
goods to the law, a continuation of their national policy since 1993. Finally,
the French authorities added various classifications and procedures to their
policy, including the requirement for cultural goods to have a certificate
when they leave France (Weidema 2014: 38–41).
The European policy was not contested in France, as it merged easily with
the existing French policy. The national formal policy can be characterized as
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rather protective, rooted in the strong emphasis in French politics on present-
ing and preserving cultural heritage (Loosely 2003: 228). For implementation,
France employs a centralized system of licensing. This policy fits with the cen-
tralized political system and allows for minimal differences between the main
stakeholders in their view on cultural heritage. Furthermore, the centralization
of implementation, in which the assessments of the committee of experts on
the exportability of cultural goods is merely consultative, limits the possibility
of deviation (Weidema 2014: 49). Based on this preference configuration, we
would classify the French implementation as a case of incidental domestic
adaptation.
4.4. Lithuania
Lithuania had prepared to adopt the EU policy framework before its accession
to the EU, in 1996, by adopting the Law on the Protection of Moveable Cul-
tural Property. This law defines cultural objects and the institutions involved
in their assessment and protection. The definition of cultural objects is
more extensive than in the EU policy, including, for example, ‘all moveable
creations created 50 years ago and earlier’ (Klein 2014: 31). The broad cat-
egories of the law suggest a more restrictive policy than the European law.
In the year of accession, Parliament adopted Resolutions 1107 and 1424 defin-
ing export procedures. These resolutions refer to both the EU Council Regu-
lation and the definitions adopted in the 1996 domestic law.
The preferences of Lithuanian policy-makers can be established based on
party manifestos of the main political parties entering parliament in the 2012
elections. While not all parties mention culture in their manifestos, the Social
Democratic Party specifically referred to the need to modernize heritage
management programmes with support from the EUs Structural Funds.
They also stated the need to protect cultural heritage from ‘excessively liberal-
ized and chaotic administration’, which can be read as opposition to the
existing EU policy (Klein 2014: 40). One of the main opposition parties, the
Homeland Union, also pointed at the need for more funds and argued that
the policy should be redesigned and updated. By contrast, another opposition
party, the Liberal Movement, the fourth biggest after the 2012 elections,
declared to seek a balance between heritage protection and business
interests, placing itself on the more liberal, market-oriented part of the
spectrum.
The administrative actor responsible for implementation is central govern-
ment’s Cultural Property Export Control Division. This division, which is part of
the Department of Cultural Heritage Protection within the Ministry of Culture,
issues export permits and investigates cultural objects found by the police,
customs or others (Arulienė 2001). Interestingly, the division’s work falls
under the National Cultural Heritage Commission. This broad expert
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committee, which is in charge of the Lithuania’s culture policy, reports directly
to parliament and the executive.
The implementers’ preferences appear to be focused on the 1996 law,
defining broad protection of Lithuanian cultural goods. The EU policy is
assessed as appropriate, but seems to be regarded as a supplement to the
already used national criteria and licensing. The most heated debates sur-
rounded the question of whether the Department of Cultural Heritage Protec-
tion should be responsible not only for registering but also for maintaining
cultural objects, and especially those defined as national treasures. A church
fire, which destroyed an unknown number of objects in 2012, brought this
issue into focus (Klein 2014: 39–40). The main subject of controversy in the
debate was whether the Church or the state, represented by the Department
of Cultural Heritage Protection, were responsible for registering, maintaining
and protecting cultural objects located on church property. The interviewed
expert stated that for the Department of Cultural Heritage the problem of
maintenance of registered cultural objects was primarily one of resources
(Klein 2014: 45).
Even based only on the positions of the parties that expressed a clear pre-
ference, the unanimity set in Lithuania is quite broad and preferences do not
coincide with the European policy. With an implementing agency following a
more protective stance, we classify Lithuania’s preference configuration as
domestic adaptation.
4.5. Comparison
Table 2 provides an overview of the domestic positions and the predicted
policy based on our model. The table also presents the actual policies in
the four cases: the formal, legislative policy and the informal, implemented
policy. The implemented policies in the UK and the Netherlands are very
much in line with the European policy. As traders, both countries have
more market-oriented procedures and fewer restrictive mechanisms for
export, fitting to the European policy. France and Lithuania, however, have
more protective national policies. While in France the domestic unanimity
set is rather small, including an implementing department within a line-min-
istry, it is wide in Lithuania, where the implementing division is closely con-
nected to an expert council protecting cultural heritage. Both France and
Lithuania use additional criteria, but in Lithuania implementation follows pri-
marily national rather than European criteria (Klein 2014: 42). The national
policies seem to correspond with predictions we made based on our
model. The most important factor that influences implementation appears
to be the size of the national unanimity set. In combination with weak Com-
mission monitoring, this provides opportunities for different implementation
responses.
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Table 2. Positions of the different member states and prediction under ‘weak’ Commission oversight.
Unanimity set versus
European policy Implementing agency Predicted policy
Formal (legislative)
policy (pF) Informal (implemented) policy (pI)
UK Small set favouring
trade
Decentralized (e.g., experts versus RCEWA):
established assessment criteria (coinciding
national preferences)
(1) Incidental domestic
compliance pF = pI = q
More liberal
national policy
Aligned with national formal policy





Centralized (e.g., ministry): established criteria
within the EU framework (coinciding national
preferences)
(1) Incidental domestic
compliance pF = pI = q
More liberal
national policy
Aligned with EU law
France Small set favouring
preservation
Centralized (e.g., ministry): protective policy
(coinciding national preferences)
(3a) Incidental domestic
adaptation pF = pI
More protective
national policy
Aligned with national formal policy
Lithuania Wide set favouring
trade and
preservation
Centralized (e.g., division in ministry): protective
policy (non-coinciding preferences)
(3c) Domestic adaptation
pF ≠ q and pF ≠ pI
More protective
national policy


















The model and analyses presented here aim to contribute to the literature
dealing with actual policy implementation (Börzel et al. 2010; Di Lucia and
Kronsell 2010; Falkner et al. 2005; Martinsen and Vollaard 2014; Vasev and
Vrangbæk 2014; Versluis 2007; Zhelyazkova et al. 2016). The model focuses
on single policy sectors, and its approach fits well with recent findings focus-
ing on the importance of state bureaucrats as implementers of EU policy
(Vasev and Vrangbaek 2014).
We see compliance or lack thereof as a consequence of the diverse prefer-
ences of a broad group of political and administrative actors and their
complex and iterative actions at several different levels. Political-level agree-
ment is important to institute a formal policy, but to have it implemented,
administrative authorities across the EU need to be aware of each others’
roles and to co-ordinate their actions. Even then, their own preferences
may lead them to make a different policy on the ground when domestic poli-
ticians are divided.
Our model shows that for informal policy to be equivalent to the domestic
formal and European policy, rather specific circumstances are required. If pol-
itical and administrative actors at the European and domestic level have
different views, other policy states are more likely. In these policy states, the
domestic policy may differ from the European policy, owing to the limitations
of Commission enforcement.
The model’s other substantial innovation is to differentiate between dom-
estic implementer’s behaviour under weak and strong enforcement. There are
member states and policy areas where the Commission may focus its atten-
tion on the informal policy, because of policy priorities or expectation of pro-
blems. Such member states would not be in a position to depart from the
European policy, even if domestic actors would have different preferences,
leading to a policy state of imposed formal compliance. Other member
states function under weaker control allowing for domestic adaptation of
the European policy.
In our empirical analysis we have found rather different domestic policies
in several member states. The distance between the EU policy and the pre-
ferences of national actors – political and administrative – was sometimes
quite large. This diversity in national implementation has an impact on
the European policy as a whole. Only when national implementers co-ordi-
nate their efforts in satisfying the main policy requirements (e.g., maintain-
ing a register for moveable cultural goods of national significance and a
proper procedure identifying these goods), implementation can be success-
ful. This points to an implementation problem that is not related to the indi-
vidual country performance, but to the joined performance of national
administrations. Owing to the lack of sufficient policy co-ordination – the
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different national implementing policies – implementation was unsuccessful
at the EU level and the actual effects from the existing European policy were
minimal. The low number of return proceedings led to a general realization
that Directive 93/7/EEC did not achieve its goal and subsequent recasting of
the Directive. The new instrument, Directive 2014/60/EU, amended previous
legislation in a substantial way to drop financial thresholds for cultural
goods classified as national treasures. The new Directive and the Commis-
sion Communication (2014a) and Mapping report (Commission 2014b) indi-
cate the way to meaningful implementation is through co-operation of the
national administrative authorities. This formal and explicit recognition of
the role of administrative actors is in line with the theoretical arguments
advanced in this article.
Additional factors that emerged as important for implementation based
on the case study analyses were the capacity of specific departments
tasked with implementation in terms of manpower and expertise (in the
UK) and the resources available for the implementation of the policy (in
Lithuania). This finding suggests that actor-driven models should take
resources into account, as Vasev and Vrangbaek (2014) have done.
However, it is still unclear based on the examined cases whether the
resources that matter are the means assigned to a policy area based on gov-
ernment ideology or the resources available to the administration in general.
Some light on this is shed by Zhelyazkova et al.’s (2016) findings suggesting
that good implementation is much less likely when the specificity of the
policy area (part of the welfare state or not) means it requires substantial
investment. In the case of cultural heritage policy, we find that a level of har-
monization between member states required some investment in a register
of moveable cultural objects, but not of a comparable magnitude with social
policy.
Based on differences in national policy preferences and European super-
vision, our model predicts that a diverse and fragmentized pattern of policy
implementation is quite likely. With regard to moveable cultural heritage
and the return of stolen national treasures, the EU is trying to address
this problem by building common knowledge and sharing implementing
practices. Awareness and co-ordination between administrative actors,
which the EU has called for and embedded in its recast Directive,
however, may not be enough. This is especially relevant when powerful
domestic discourses – for example linked to national history and identity
– shape the preferences of implementing actors. Therefore, we can expect
common implementation practices to remain elusive, at least until co-ordi-
nation of administrative actions is supported by EU-wide debates and
shared discourses about the role of national cultural heritage in a European
context.
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Notes
1. Compliance is defined here as the extent to which domestic actors – policy-
makers or administrators – produce the same policy outcomes as formulated
in European policy.
2. The results of the individual capstone projects are reported in Houwing (2015),
Klein (2014), Netten (2014) and Weidema (2014). As part of these projects and in
addition to documentary sources, six expert interviews have been conducted:
two in the Netherlands, Lithuania and the UK.
3. If we broadly define a policy as a set of (formal and informal) rules and practices
aiming to achieve a certain objective with regard to a particular issue or a sector,
the formal policy is defined by (primary and secondary) legislation and is
enforceable by third parties. The informal policy consists of the rules that are
used in practice and the way actors actually apply them.
4. The Commission sometimes needs to involve other actors, chiefly the European
Court of Justice, to achieve compliance. Notwithstanding the Court’s impor-
tance, we disregard these interactions, since we focus on the domestic
implementation process.
5. Of course, this assumption can be relaxed. Steunenberg (2010) has shown
that a Commission supporting higher levels of European regulation than
domestic actors will act as ‘guardian of the treaties’. In case of a preference
for lower levels than domestic actors, the Commission will support deviation
by not acting against it (’silent witness’). In the area of cultural heritage, as we
will discuss later, it seems that the Commission preferred a higher level of
harmonization, which it had to water down during the revision of Directive
93/7/EEC.
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